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What Drives FDI from Non-traditional Sources? 












Abstract: Non-traditional source countries of FDI play an increasingly important role, notably 
in developing host countries. This raises the question of whether the determinants of FDI 
differ systematically between traditional and non-traditional source countries. We perform 
Logit and Poisson Pseudo  Maximum Likelihood estimations drawing on UNCTAD’s 
database on bilateral FDI flows, including various emerging and developing countries as 
sources of FDI outflows. We find that economic geography variables are more relevant for 
FDI from non-traditional sources, while non-traditional investors appear to be as risk adverse 
as traditional investors. Access to raw materials represents a less important driving force of 
FDI from non-traditional sources. The differences are less pronounced for other types of FDI. 
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1.  Introduction 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) based outside the OECD have attracted a lot of interest 
recently. According to Santiso (2007), “the entire global corporate chessboard is changing 
rapidly” as new MNEs are emerging in various Asian and Latin American countries. The 
Economist (2008) reckons that “a new breed” of MNEs challenges the more traditional ones 
based in Europe, Japan and North America. A study by Boston Consulting Group (2006) 
outlines different strategies used by MNEs from emerging markets to expand sales and 
production internationally. The share of developing and transition economies in outward FDI 
stocks from all sources was about 17.5 percent in 2010 (UNCTAD 2011: annex table I.2). In 
most recent years (2009-2010), more than 28 percent of overall FDI outflows originated from 
developing and transition economies. This suggests that non-traditional sources become 
increasingly important, even though the most developed source countries may regain some 
ground after overcoming the financial crisis. 
The rise of “new” foreign investors would not only involve competitive challenges for 
established MNEs based in the most advanced countries. At the same time, this development 
could be highly relevant for the host countries of FDI, by providing better chances to attract 
more FDI. Investment promotion agencies may have more options available to lure FDI from 
different sources (Sauvant 2008). Furthermore, FDI from emerging markets may be better 
adapted to local conditions in developing host countries. Hence, it could be especially those 
host countries that had been sidelined by direct investors from the most advanced countries 
which can now benefit from non-traditional FDI flows. Indeed, Aykut and Ratha (2003) find 
that more than one-third of FDI flows to developing economies originated from other 
developing economies in the 1990s already. 
This leads to the question of whether foreign direct investors based in emerging 
markets and developing countries behave differently from traditional investors. Surprisingly, 
this question has received little attention in the previous empirical literature on the 
determinants of FDI. In particular, hardly any evidence exists on whether the location choices 
of foreign investors from non-traditional sources are affected by other pull factors than the 
location choices of traditional investors. In the following, we employ gravity-type models to 
address important dimensions of this question. In particular, we assess whether neighboring 
markets represent a more important pull factor of FDI from non-traditional sources; whether 
economic instability and political risk in the host countries hinder FDI from non-traditional 
sources less than FDI from traditional sources; whether cost motives and access to raw 
materials are driving FDI from both traditional and non-traditional sources; and whether 3 
 
asset-seeking motives attract FDI from non-traditional sources to more advanced host 
countries. 
We estimate Logit and Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood models, drawing on 
bilateral FDI flow data from UNCTAD’s Data Extract Service. Importantly, the dataset 
covers various emerging and developing countries as sources of FDI outflows. This allows us 
to pay heed to Wells’ (2009: 40) warning that “it remains important to go beyond country 
studies to look for general patterns.” Before describing the dataset in more detail in Section 3, 
we summarize the analytical background of our empirical analysis and the relevant literature 
in Section 2. Section 4 presents the estimation results. We find that economic geography 
variables are more relevant for FDI from non-traditional sources, while  non-traditional 
investors appear to be as risk adverse as traditional investors. Access to raw materials 
represents a less important driving force of FDI from non-traditional sources. The differences 
are less pronounced for other types of FDI. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Previous literature and hypotheses 
In the light of recent claims according to which new MNEs are reshaping the “entire global 
corporate chessboard” (Santiso 2007), it may be surprising that a first wave of new MNEs 
from non-traditional sources was spotted in the late 1970s and early 1980s already (e.g., Lall 
1983; Wells 1983).
1 As a matter of fact, large parts of the recent literature have a similar 
focus as earlier contributions by concentrating on the push factors of FDI, i.e., the 
characteristics  of the firms and those of the countries where the new MNEs are based. 
Dunning’s eclectic theory of FDI (e.g., Dunning 2001)  and the related concept of the 
investment development path (Dunning 1981) provide the most widely used analytical 
background.
2
The heterogeneous firm model of Helpman et al. (2004) predicts that only the most 
productive firms engage in FDI to serve foreign markets. In other words, ownership 
advantages are required to overcome the “liability of foreignness,” i.e., to compensate the 
disadvantage vis-à-vis local firms of conducting operations abroad (Hymer 1976). Moreover, 
 This literature is also relevant in the present context of host-country pull factors 
of FDI. If only indirectly, the discussion of the so-called ownership (or: proprietary) 
advantages of MNEs allows for inferences with regard to their location choices, and how 
these choices may differ between traditional and non-traditional MNEs. 
                                                 
1 See Hernández (2008) for an annotated bibliography on outward FDI from emerging markets. 
2  Ownership-specific characteristics represent the first building block of the so-called OLI framework 
(ownership, location, internalization). 4 
 
in the context of FDI from new sources, specific ownership advantages are required to 
compete with MNEs based in economically more advanced source countries. The ownership 
advantages of the latter are commonly attributed to firm-specific “proprietary technology, 
powerful brands, marketing prowess, and other managerial capabilities” (Ramamurti 2009b: 
405). 
In the earlier literature, the ownership advantages of new MNEs were mainly derived 
from technological adaptation to the conditions typically prevailing in developing countries. 
For instance, Lall (1983: 6) argued that MNEs  based in less developed  countries  have 
advantages vis-à-vis competitors from more advanced countries because of “the ability to 
function better in the environment of other LDCs (governmental, climatic, cultural)”. 
Newcomers may compete successfully with traditional MNEs “not merely because their 
processes and products are better adapted to local factor prices, factor quality, and demand 
conditions, but also because the direction of their innovation can provide techniques which 
are efficient at smaller scales than currently used in developed countries.” Likewise, Wells 
argued that the location choices of Third World MNEs followed almost immediately from 
their peculiar characteristics compared to more traditional MNEs. Technologies and products 
were “generated from the conditions of the home countries and thus might be especially well 
suited to the needs of other developing countries” (Wells 1983: 3), notably those in the closer 
neighborhood (see also Dunning et al. 1998; UNCTAD 2006: 104 and 117). Ramamurti 
(2009b: 409) argues that non-traditional MNEs enjoy an “adversity advantage” as they are 
able “to function effectively in the difficult conditions of emerging markets, where both the 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ infrastructures were missing.” 
This invites several hypotheses related to FDI determinants that are typically 
considered in gravity-type empirical models (see also Section 3 for details): 
H1: The geographical distance between the source country and the host countries should 
discourage FDI from non-traditional sources more strongly than FDI from traditional sources 
if new MNEs have competitive advantages mainly in neighboring developing countries. 
H2: The familiarity of new MNEs with political and economic conditions prevailing in many 
developing countries could render them less risk adverse so that their FDI is less discouraged 
by political uncertainty and economic instability that FDI from traditional sources. 
H3:  The size of host-country markets could have a weaker impact on FDI from non-
traditional sources if new MNEs were locating primarily where the local purchasing power is 
relatively small. 5 
 
The more recent literature suggests that subsequent waves of FDI from non-traditional 
sources are to be attributed to a broader set of motives and more diverse competitive 
advantages. This could also imply that some pull factors are driving FDI from both traditional 
and non-traditional sources. Specifically, UNCTAD (2006: 158) concludes from surveys of 
MNEs based in several emerging markets that “market-seeking FDI is by far the most 
common type of strategy for developing-country TNCs in their process of 
internationalization.” Chudnovsky and López (2000) find that the bulk of Latin American 
outward FDI aims at penetrating the markets  in other Latin American countries.  These 
findings qualify H3  above, considering that market-seeking (or: horizontal) FDI typically 
turns out to be the most important motive in surveys of OECD-based MNEs, too. H3 may 
hold as long as horizontal FDI from new sources is concentrated in smaller host economies 
with relatively low per-capita income. On the other hand, FDI from non-traditional sources 
may focus on host countries offering larger market potential and higher economic growth.  
Similar ambiguity prevails with regard to cost motives as a driving force of vertical 
(or: efficiency-seeking) FDI as well as the motive to access raw materials in resource-rich 
countries by means of FDI. Wells (1983: 76) observed that export-oriented firms sought 
“lower wages than their home countries offered” already during the first wave of FDI from 
non-traditional sources. Likewise, Aykut and Ratha (2003: 168) suspect that some new MNEs 
have undertaken vertical FDI “following an erosion in their export competitiveness.” 
Taiwanese FDI in mainland China provides a case in point; cost-saving motives have played 
an important role since the second half of the 1980s because of the appreciation of the New 
Taiwan Dollar and rising labor costs in Taiwan (Liu and Nunnenkamp 2011). However, 
survey results indicate that the prevalence of vertical FDI “varies considerably among 
developing-country TNCs, especially in terms of their country or region of origin and 
industry” (UNCTAD 2006: 158-9).  
The same is probably true for resource-seeking FDI. While this type of FDI is widely 
discussed, notably with regard to Chinese FDI in Africa (e.g., Reisen and Rieländer 2011), its 
prominence appears to be limited to selected non-traditional source countries and the more 
recent past. According to UNCTAD (2006: 161), resource-seeking FDI is rated to be of 
“moderate significance” in surveys of MNEs from non-traditional source countries. 
Ambiguous findings are reported in recent country studies. The evidence is mixed even for 
Chinese FDI. Cheung et al. (2011) show that the endowment of host countries with natural 
resources is not significantly related with Chinese FDI in Africa. Buckley et al. (2007) come 6 
 
to a similar conclusion, except for the more recent past. Pradhan (2011: 140) reports opposing 
results for Chinese and Indian FDI. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H4:  Vertical FDI should figure more prominently for MNEs based in traditional source 
countries where wage costs tend to be higher, on average, than in less advanced source 
countries.  
H5:  Access to raw materials may induce FDI from both traditional and non-traditional 
sources. However, resource-seeking FDI is unlikely to constitute a particularly large share in 
the FDI portfolio of the latter. 
As noted by Busse et al. (2010), the difference between the average per-capita income 
in the source country and that in the host country is typically used to capture the relevance of 
vertical FDI undertaken by relatively rich source countries in poorer host countries.
3 At the 
same time, another type of FDI may flow from relatively poor source countries to richer host 
countries, i.e., asset-seeking (or: asset-augmenting) FDI used as a means to acquire superior 
foreign technology.
4 UNCTAD (2006: 136) reports “a noticeable increase” in FDI from non-
traditional sources in many developed countries.
5 While developed countries may be the most 
obvious target to acquire superior technology, this type of FDI appears to be in some conflict 
with the conventional view that foreign direct investors need to command over some form of 
ownership advantage. Moon and Roehl (2001: 197) introduce “the idea of imbalance, as 
opposed to advantage” as the theoretical basis of unconventional types of FDI, including 
asset-seeking FDI by emerging source countries.
6
H6: While asset-seeking FDI is mainly undertaken by MNEs based in lower-income source 
countries, its quantitative importance is likely to be limited as long as many non-traditional 
source countries have insufficient capabilities to absorb superior technology. 
 Accordingly, firms invest abroad to redress 
an imbalance between advantages and disadvantages in their competitive position. In this 
context, Moon and Roehl (2001) argue that asset-augmenting FDI (seeking assets to support 
cheaper labor) is conceptually similar to vertical FDI (seeking cheaper labor to support 
proprietary assets), provided that new MNEs are capable of making efficient use of the 
acquired assets. 
                                                 
3 According to the knowledge-capital model of MNEs, skill differences between the labor force in the source and 
the host countries would be a preferred indicator (Carr et al. 2001). However, the relevant data are missing for 
many host countries. 
4 The difficulties of separating vertical from asset-augmenting FDI are discussed in more detail in Section 4 
below. 
5 Dunning et al. (2008: 168) see signs of a new wave of asset-augmenting FDI from emerging markets in 
developed host countries. 
6 Similarly, Luo and Tung (2007) present an international “springboard perspective” according to which new 
MNEs undertake FDI to compensate for their competitive disadvantages and latecomer disadvantages.  7 
 
Generally speaking, no consensus has emerged from the previous literature on whether 
and how relatively new MNEs based in emerging markets differ from more traditional MNEs 
(Ramamurti 2009a). Some authors, including Aykut and Ratha (2003: 172), claim that the rise 
in South-South FDI flows is due to similar factors as the surge in North-South FDI flows. 
However, the factors considered are often broadly defined (e.g., the search of MNEs for 
higher risk-adjusted returns through diversification), and the relative importance of different 
factors is left open to debate (see also UNCTAD 2006). Dunning et al. (1998; 2008) posit that 
new MNEs from at least some emerging source countries such as Korea and Taiwan are 
becoming increasingly similar to traditional MNEs from the most advanced source countries. 
By contrast, Rugman (2009: 53) doubts that many MNEs from emerging economies are “truly 
internationalized” and sees “few signs of developing any proprietary FSAs [firm-specific 
advantages].” These contrasting views are typically based on descriptive information for a 
limited and unrepresentative set of MNEs. 
Few econometric investigations exist on the determinants of FDI from non-traditional 
sources. This is in striking contrast to the large literature on FDI from traditional sources.
7 
Recent empirical investigations of Chinese FDI provide notable exceptions (Buckley et al. 
2007; Cheung et al. 2011). However, FDI from this source is peculiar in various respects, e.g., 
because of the prominence of state-owned enterprises as foreign direct investors. Moreover, it 
is only since 2003 that China has published data on outward FDI in line with international 
(IMF/OECD) standards (Cheung et al. 2011).
8
 
 We are aware of just two comparative studies 
on FDI from non-traditional sources. Pradhan (2011) compares Chinese and Indian outward 
FDI. In contrast, our focus is on comparing non-traditional sources of FDI with traditional 
sources. Gao (2005) is closer to our approach, finding that FDI from five developing 
economies in East and Southeast Asia exhibits some distinctive features, compared to FDI 
from developed OECD countries. FDI from developing Asia is less encouraged by higher per-
capita GDP of host countries, but more discouraged by larger distance to the host country. 
However, Gao’s (2005) analysis is restricted to cross-sectional OLS and Tobit estimations 
with the sum of FDI flows over four years, 1994-1997, as the dependent variable. 
3.  Gravity approach and data 
We estimate gravity-type models on the determinants of FDI. Initially applied in the empirical 
literature on bilateral trade flows, the gravity approach naturally built up into FDI analysis so 
                                                 
7 For recent overviews, see Chakrabarti (2001) and Blonigen (2005). 
8 Buckley et al. (2007) use approvals rather than realized FDI outflows.  8 
 
as to become “the most widely used empirical application of FDI” (Blonigen et al. 2007: 
1309). According to Mátyás (1997), a correct specification of a gravity model includes time 
fixed effects (to account for the effects of business cycles or globalization processes on the 
analyzed variables over the sample) as well as time-invariant source and host country effects. 
Egger (2000) demonstrates that such specification allows unraveling time-specific and 
country-specific effects, which are motivated by geographical, historical and political 
contexts, and outperforms the random effects specification. Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) incorporate the concept of “multilateral resistance”, meaning that trade between any 
two countries depends not only on their bilateral barriers but also on the average barriers of 
the two countries to all other trading partners. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) as well as 
Feenstra (2004) suggest that country-specific fixed effects offer a computationally simple 
method to account for multilateral resistance terms and give consistent estimates in cross-
section gravity models. For panel data specifications and turning specifically to FDI, 
Bergstrand and Egger (2007) argue on similar lines but include bilateral pair fixed effects so 
as to control for unobserved time-invariant pair-specific heterogeneity.
9
Against this backdrop, we employ two different specifications regarding fixed effects. 
In our first model we include country and time fixed effects so as to allow for time-invariant 
bilateral variables, such as distance and cultural ties, to enter our model. This specification 
assumes that there is no time-invariant pair-specific heterogeneity. Our second specification 
follows Bergstrand and Egger (2007) and includes time and pair fixed effects. This second 
model will require some modifications in the gravity equation so as to account for time-
variant bilateral variables only.  
 
The basic specification of our gravity model is as follows: 
 
  ε ϕ µ λ φ φ γ γ α ijt j i t ijt i ijt jt i jt ijt Y Emerging Y X Emerging X fdi + + + + + + + + = 1 0 1 0 log   (1) 
 
logfdiijt represents the natural logarithm of bilateral FDI flows from country i to country j at 
period  t.  Xjt  are a set of control variables for the host country. Yijt  are pair-specific 
characteristics. Emerging is a dummy variable which equals one when the source of FDI is an 
emerging country. λt, μi and φj are time, source country and host country dummy variables. 
                                                 
9 Baier and Bergstrand (2007) incorporate country-time effects, assuming that multilateral resistance terms are 
time varying. Bergstrand and Egger (2007) consider the effects to be “slow moving” so that pair fixed effects 
should capture “the (most important) cross sectional influence of these terms”. 9 
 
The dataset covers the period from 1978 to 2004.
10 Given the high fluctuation of 
annual bilateral FDI flows we calculate 3-year averages so as to smooth our dependent 
variable and,  at the same time,  ensure  that we have enough variation in the data. All 
remaining negative flows are  set at zero so as to maximize the number of applicable 
observations.
11
Our sample includes 85 developing and emerging host countries as well as 25 
developed host countries, which allows us to avoid sample selection bias.
 
12
We include a fairly standard group of independent variables, based on previous 
literature.
 The key element 
of our analysis is the separate treatment of emerging and developed source countries. Our 
database includes 11 non-traditional and 18 traditional sources. Appendices C and D provide 
lists of the source and host countries. 
13 Importantly, various variables are closely linked to the hypotheses introduced in 
Section 2. First, we consider a set of gravity-type variables to measure distance between the 
source and the host country. The distance in kilometers between both countries is calculated 
as the weighted average of the distances between their main cities (logdistance).
14
Several of our independent variables relate to hypothesis H2 which claims that FDI 
from non-traditional sources is less discouraged by political uncertainty and economic 
instability. As for political uncertainty we enter  polcon  which  measures the political 
constraints of the executive branch, as constructed by Henisz (2000). This variable is expected 
to have a positive effect on FDI as higher values imply stricter constraints and less political 
 In addition, 
three dummy variables are set equal to one if the source and the host country share a common 
border (contig), a common language (comlang) or colonial ties (colony). All these variables 
are available from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII 
2011). We expect the effect of distance to be significant and negative for both groups of 
source countries. However, hypothesis H1 predicts that distance should discourage FDI from 
non-traditional sources more strongly than FDI from traditional sources. On the other hand, 
sharing a border, language or colonial ties should affect bilateral FDI flows positively. 
According to H1, this should apply particularly to FDI from emerging markets. 
                                                 
10 UNCTAD data on bilateral FDI flows are scarce for earlier years. We choose to start with 1978 to avoid any 
possible bias arising from small samples. 
11 More precisely, we took the natural logarithm of all positive flows of FDI and set the remaining flows at zero.  
12  We exclude offshore financial centers like Panama, the Bahamas or the Cayman Islands. Note that FDI 
channeled for tax reasons through financial centers to other host countries in our sample cannot be accounted for. 
13 For detailed definitions of the subsequent variables, data sources and summary statistics, see Appendices A 
and B. 
14 The population of the main cities is used as weights for calculating the average distance. In our pair fixed 
effects specification, we replace this time-invariant distance measure (and other time-invariant gravity variables) 
by an alternative distance measure that varies over time. Specifically, we follow Polak (1996) and Warin et al. 
(2009) and divide logdistance by the population of the host country (see below). 10 
 
discretion. FDI from non-traditional source countries might be less affected by polcon due to 
the familiarity with less stable political environments. Inflation is expected to affect FDI 
negatively as it proxies macroeconomic instability. Again, investors from emerging markets 
might be less affected because of their familiarity with economic uncertainty. In addition, we 
introduce several dummy variables on bilateral and regional agreements that may help contain 
political and economic uncertainty, thereby inducing higher FDI flows. In particular, we 
control for bilateral investment treaties (bit), double taxation treaties (dtt) and regional trade 
agreements (rta) to which source-host pairs are members. 
In order to assess hypothesis H3 on market-seeking or horizontal FDI we include the 
host country’s GDP (loggdphost) and GDP growth (hostgrw). Both market size and growth 
are widely expected to induce horizontal FDI as they signal the attractiveness of the country 
for the parent company to set up a production facility to serve the local market. As for H4 on 
vertical or efficiency-seeking FDI we incorporate the difference in per-capita GDP between 
the source and the host country (diffgpdpc). In addition, we take into account that the host 
country’s openness to trade (hosttrade) may induce vertical FDI.
15
As concerns H5 on resource-seeking FDI we include the depletion of natural resources 
in percent of gross national income of the host country (resourcedeplet), as available from the 
World Bank. This variable should have a positive sign if FDI is oriented to countries rich in 
natural resources where the rate of depletion is high.
 
16
 Finally, we account for the well-documented effect of agglomeration on FDI.
 In extended specifications, we also 
enter the intensity of patenting (patents) to capture the technological sophistication of the host 
country. Higher values of patents are supposed to induce asset-augmenting FDI so that this 
variable allows us to address hypothesis H6. 
17
To test our hypotheses we make use of two different estimators. As an initial stage we 
analyze the determinants of a country to undertake any FDI at all in another country. For the 
 
Agglomeration is proxied by the total stock of FDI from all sources in the host country 
(logfdistock). We expect investors from emerging markets to be attracted even more by 
agglomeration than investors from traditional source countries. FDI in countries with a long 
reputation of being attractive would be regarded as profitable by latecomers which are, 
therefore, likely to follow the location choices of their more experienced peers. 
                                                 
15 Closed economies are hardly attractive to vertical FDI which involves fragmented production patterns and 
international trade in intermediates. 
16 More precisely, the odds or incidence rate ratios of the models introduced below should be significantly above 
one, though not necessarily for FDI from non-traditional sources according to H5. 
17 See, for example, the initial work of Head et al. (1995) and more recently Head and Mayer (2004) or Buch et 
al. (2005). 11 
 
first stage we rely on a Logit model, where the dependent variable is discrete and set equal to 
one if a source country invests any positive amount in a host country. 
 At the second stage our dependent variable is the total amount in US dollars invested 
by a source country in a host country. Given the fact that bilateral FDI flows are zero for 
around three quarters of our observations we cannot use Ordinary Least Squares to estimate 
the model as results would be highly biased. We must use a non-linear model to account for 
the censored FDI data. As explained by Head and Ries (2008), the problem was originally 
tackled by Eaton and Tamura (1994) and later Wei (2000) by using a Tobit approach. 
Subsequently, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) proved that the Tobit approach would yield 
biased results if the model suffered from heteroskedasticity. The authors suggest using 
Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PML), which they prove to be robust and to yield 
consistent estimates. An additional advantage of the Poisson PML is that it incorporates the 
zero values of the dependent variable, as opposed to Tobit.
18
As noted before, we are primarily interested to identify the different impact of our 
independent variables on FDI decisions by traditional and non-traditional source countries. 
Instead of running separate regressions for the subsample of non-traditional sources of FDI 
and then comparing the results with some benchmark results for developed countries, we run 
pooled regressions with all source countries so as to increase the flexibility of testing for 
statistically significant differences between non-traditional and traditional sources. By 
introducing a dummy variable for the non-traditional  source countries  (emerging)  and 
interacting this dummy with all independent variables introduced above we mirror separate 
regressions for each subsample. 
  Against this backdrop we 
estimate a fixed effects Poisson PML model in the second stage of our analysis. 
The coefficients of interaction terms in non-linear models like Logit cannot be directly 
interpreted. However, as discussed in Gill (2001), it is possible to estimate the model in the 
odds of a successful outcome, instead of in probabilities. Specifically for our first stage 
estimation of bilateral FDI flows such specification would imply estimating the odds of a 
source country choosing to invest in a host country versus the odds of not choosing that host 
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18 Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 19) details the properties of the Poisson PML for continuous and non-negative 
independent variables.  12 
 
With this transformation the specification of interaction terms becomes 
straightforward as in linear models and can be estimated with standard numerical procedures 
like maximum likelihood. According to Gill (2001), if the fitness of the model improves by 
the introduction of interaction terms then at least part of the true interaction between the 
variables of the model will be captured by the estimation. Consequently, we specify our 
model in the log of odds so as to be able to interpret our results directly. We follow the same 
rationale for the Poisson PML model and estimate it in incidence rate ratios, which can be 
interpreted similarly as odds in Logit models. 
 
4.  Results 
We present our estimation results in several steps. Table 1 summarizes the Logit results in 
terms of odds ratios in order to assess the decisions of foreign investors on whether or not to 
engage with FDI in a particular location. Location choices at this gatekeeping stage, as it is 
often called in the literature on the allocation of foreign aid, imply a binary dependent 
variable taking the value of one whenever FDI flows from a particular source country to a 
particular host country (independent of the size of the flow), and zero when there is no 
bilateral FDI flow in period t. In the next step,  we present Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood estimations in terms of exponentiated coefficients, i.e., incidence rate ratios (IRRs) 
with the log of bilateral FDI flows as the dependent variable (Table 2). Note that odds ratios 
and IRRs below one reveal a negative impact of the corresponding determinant on bilateral 
FDI flows, whereas ratios above one reveal a positive impact. It should also be recalled from 
Section 3 that all Logit and Poisson models in Tables 1 and 2 include time dummies as well as 
source-country and host-country fixed effects. In this way, we account for time-specific 
effects on bilateral FDI flows that essentially affect all source-host country pairs as well as 
unobserved heterogeneity among source and host countries of FDI. Finally, we extend the 
specification of the basic Poisson model (Table 3) and perform panel estimations with fixed 
effects for each source-host country pair (Table 4). 
 
Logit model results 
The Logit estimation shown in column I of Table 1 pools all traditional and non-traditional 
source countries without attempting to capture varying effects of FDI determinants between 
the two subgroups. However, we include a dummy variable set equal to one for non-
traditional source countries (emerging) which reveals that the odds of engaging with bilateral 
FDI are significantly lower for non-traditional source countries. As can be seen, geography 13 
 
and history clearly matter at the gatekeeping stage. The odds of engaging with bilateral FDI in 
a particular location are considerably lower for larger distances between a source-host country 
pair, while the odds are considerably higher for pairs sharing a common language (comlang) 
or past colonial ties (colony). At the same time, the conclusion of bilateral treaties (dtt, bit) is 
associated with significantly higher odds of bilateral FDI engagements. The odds of bilateral 
FDI engagements are also higher, at the five percent level of significance, where the political 
environment is less risky (reflected in higher values of polcon).  
Column I provides little insight on the variables supposed to be relevant for different 
types of FDI. The proxies used to account for determinants of horizontal FDI, loggdphost and 
hostgrw, have the expected odds ratios above one but fail to pass conventional significance 
levels. The odds ratio of diffgdppc even turns out to be significantly below one, suggesting 
that the likelihood of vertical FDI decreases with higher income gaps between the source and 
the host country. The proxy for resource-seeking FDI, resourcedeplet, enters insignificant. All 
this is surprising even though the evidence resembles expectations more closely in the second 
stage of deciding on the size of FDI flows (see below). The weak evidence for major types of 
FDI at the gatekeeping stage may be partly because the pooling of traditional and non-
traditional source countries in column I blurs the differences between the two subgroups. At 
the same time, the highly significant agglomeration variable, logfdistock, suggests that all 
types of FDI tend to flow where high FDI stocks accumulated from all sources in the past 
point to a particularly attractive location. 
In columns II-IX we successively introduce the determinants of FDI plus the 
corresponding interaction terms with the dummy for non-traditional source countries. Some of 
the hypotheses presented in Section 2 are supported, while some other hypotheses are clearly 
rejected at the gatekeeping stage of FDI-related location choices. Empirical support is 
particularly strong for H1  on the effects of geographical distance. The odds ratio of the 
interaction term emerging_logdistance is consistently below one at the one percent level of 
significance. This means that the discouraging effect of larger distances between the source 
and the host country on bilateral FDI flows is significantly stronger for FDI from non-
traditional sources. The dummy variable for neighboring countries with a common border, 
contig, and its interaction with emerging does not offer significant information in addition to 
the distance variable. By contrast, the effect of a common language is significantly stronger 
for FDI from non-traditional sources in almost all specifications. 
The widely held belief according to which FDI from non-traditional sources is less 
affected by political uncertainty and economic instability (H2) is not supported in Table 1. 14 
 
The interaction of emerging  with political uncertainty, reflected in polcon, proves to be 
insignificant at conventional levels. Economic instability, proxied by higher inflation 
(hostinfl), tends to discourage FDI from non-traditional sources, even though the interaction is 
only weekly significant. 
According to the results reported in column IV of Table 1, the odds that host countries 
with larger local markets attract FDI from non-traditional sources are significantly higher than 
the benchmark, as revealed by the interaction term emerging_loggdphost.
19 This appears to be 
in  conflict with H3  on horizontal FDI. However, this effect is highly sensitive to minor 
changes in the specification of the Logit model. By contrast, the interaction with our proxy for 
vertical FDI, emerging_diffgdppc, is above one whenever included in the specification, at the 
five percent level or better (H4).
20
In columns VIII and IX, we also account for resource-seeking FDI by introducing 
resourcedeplet as a proxy of the host countries’ endowment of raw materials as well as its 
interaction with the dummy for non-traditional sources. While this variable per se does not 
appear to matter for the benchmark at the gatekeeping stage, the corresponding interaction 
term supports H5 in that resource-seeking FDI seems to play a minor role for the location 
choices of direct investors from non-traditional source countries. The latter result is in line 
with country-specific studies such as Buckley et al. (2007) and Cheung et al. (2011). 
 The result on emerging_diffgdppc is in line with Wells 
(1983) and Aykut and Ratha (2003) who stressed the role of cost motives for FDI from non-
traditional sources, but it does not hold beyond the gatekeeping stage (see below). The 
agglomeration effect of already existing FDI stocks from all sources tends to be slightly 
stronger for bilateral FDI flows from relatively new sources; the interaction terms 
emerging_logfdistock prove to be significant at the ten percent level or better in the fully 
specified models. 
 
Poisson model: basic results 
Column I of Table 2 resembles the corresponding Logit estimation in several respects. At the 
second stage of deciding on FDI amounts, too, larger distances between the source and the 
host country discourage bilateral FDI. A common language, historical ties, and current 
                                                 
19 The same result is shown in column IX of Table 1 where we replace loggdphost by lmrp as the proxy of the 
size of the relevant host-country market. As argued by Head and Mayer (2004) the market potential measure 
derives from Krugman’s economic geography model (Krugman 1991) and includes demand from multiple 
locations discounted by distance, while at the same time incorporating the effects of borders as well as an 
adjustment from competition derived theoretically.  
20 Furthermore, the interaction with the host country’s openness to trade has an odds ratio significantly above 
one. This also suggests that vertical FDI may figure more prominently for non-traditional source countries. 15 
 
bilateral and regional treaties encourage larger FDI flows.
21
Turning to the differences between traditional and non-traditional sources, Table 2 
strengthens the support of H1. Similar to the gatekeeping stage, FDI from non-traditional 
sources is more sensitive to distance at the second stage of deciding on FDI amounts. In 
addition, larger amounts of FDI from non-traditional sources flow to neighboring countries, 
which is in striking contrast to the benchmark result on contig for the overall sample of source 
countries. The IRR on the interaction between contig  and  emerging  and its statistical 
significance weakens when successively adding further FDI determinants and the 
corresponding interaction terms. Nevertheless, the IRR continues to be larger than one at the 
ten  percent level of significance or better when estimating the  fully specified model in 
columns VIII and IX. Likewise, FDI amounts from non-traditional sources are encouraged 
over-proportionately if the source and the host country share a common language 
(emerging_comlang).
 In some other respects, however, 
the Poisson results differ from the Logit results reported above. Most notably, we now find 
strong evidence for horizontal FDI. Both the size (loggdphost) and the growth (hostgrw) of 
local markets are associated with higher bilateral FDI flows at the one percent level of 
significance. We also find that host countries’ endowment of natural resources 
(resourcedeplet) induces higher bilateral FDI flows. 
22
As concerns H2, the interaction terms capturing risk-related FDI determinants are 
again in conflict with the view that MNEs from non-traditional source countries are less risk 
adverse due to their familiarity with political uncertainty and economic instability at home. 




                                                 
21 In contrast to the Logit estimation, contig enters significantly below one in column I of Table 2. This is 
surprising even though economic relations between neighboring countries tend to be dominated by trade rather 
than FDI.  
 The same holds for the interaction terms that are supposed to capture 
differential effects of bilateral treaties as well as regional agreements on FDI from non-
traditional sources. DTTs, BITs and RTAs are widely perceived to reduce FDI-related risk. 
The results on dtt, bit and rta shown in columns VII-IX suggest that bilateral and regional 
agreements were effective in inducing higher bilateral FDI. The insignificant interaction terms 
indicate that the effectiveness of the agreements does not depend on the source of FDI. If 
22 By contrast, past colonial ties stimulate bilateral FDI flows from non-traditional sources less strongly than FDI 
from traditional sources. This is hardly surprising considering that the former colonial powers typically belong to 
the second group of source countries. 
23 The only exception is in column IX where host-country inflation appears to be associated positively with FDI 
from non-traditional sources, at the ten percent level of significance. 16 
 
investors from non-traditional source countries had been less risk adverse, one could have 
expected IRRs significantly below one for these interaction terms. 
It cannot be ruled out that the evidence on polcon as well as its interaction with the 
dummy variable for FDI from non-traditional sources is weak because this indicator does not 
capture the most relevant aspects of risk related to institutional void and poor governance. We 
performed a robustness test to account for this possibility. More precisely, we replaced polcon 
by an index on corruption in the host countries. The index is taken from the International 
Country  Risk Guide (http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx) and ranges from zero (highly 
corrupt) to six (not corrupt). The results for the other variables were hardly affected when re-
estimating the fully specified model in column VIII of Table 2 with this modification.
24
Table 2 provides mixed evidence concerning the differential impact of the driving 
forces of specific types of FDI. Findings are unambiguous for resource-seeking FDI. Similar 
to the gatekeeping stage, the Poisson model in columns VIII and IX of Table 2 reveals that the 
host countries’ endowment of natural resources represents a less important driving force of 
FDI amounts from non-traditional sources. This provides another indication in support of H5, 
according to which resource-seeking FDI is unlikely to constitute a particularly large share in 
the FDI portfolio of non-traditional source countries. 
 The 
results on corruption largely resemble those on polcon. Importantly, the interaction of the 
corruption index with the dummy variable for FDI from non-traditional sources proved to be 
insignificant, corroborating the earlier conclusion that non-traditional investors are no less 
risk adverse than the benchmark of all source countries. 
The evidence is more ambiguous with respect to H3 on horizontal FDI from non-
traditional sources. The IRRs on the interaction term emerging_loggdphost, which accounts 
for the differential impact of local market size, are significantly above one in columns III and 
IV. However, they prove to be insignificant at conventional levels once the model is specified 
more fully. The insignificance of emerging_loggdphost in columns V-VIII is mainly due to 
the inclusion of our proxy of agglomeration effects and its interaction with the dummy for 
non-traditional source countries, emerging_logfdistock.
25
                                                 
24 There is just one notable exception: The IRR on resourcedeplet is no longer significant in the estimation with 
corruption. This is probably because using the ICRG index results in the loss of almost 2,000 observations, 
mainly involving pairs with small, poor and resource-dependent host countries. Detailed results are not reported 
here for the sake of brevity, but are available on request. 
 Agglomeration effects, which are 
particularly strong for FDI from non-traditional sources, are likely to induce different types of 
25  In additional estimations not shown in detail, we excluded the proxy of agglomeration effects from the 
specifications in columns V-VIII of Table 2. With this modification  emerging_loggdphost  proved to be 
significantly above one. Likewise, the interaction of the dummy for non-traditional sources with the alternative 
measure of market size, emerging_lrmp, proved to be significantly above one when excluding the proxy of 
agglomeration effects in column IX of Table 2.  17 
 
FDI. Hence, they should be taken into account in order to avoid biased results for specific 
types of FDI. In other words, the results reported in Table 2 suggest that horizontal FDI plays 
a similarly important role for FDI from traditional and non-traditional sources. 
As concerns vertical FDI, the IRRs of the interaction term emerging_diffgdppc do not 
differ significantly from one in Table 2. In contrast to the gatekeeping stage, we no longer 
find evidence suggesting that vertical FDI figures more prominently for MNEs based in non-
traditional source countries. Nevertheless, the Poisson results still reject H4  according to 
which larger income gaps between the source and the host country are driving (vertical) FDI 
mainly from traditional sources. We suspect that income gaps reflected in diffgdppc – though 
widely used in the literature on FDI determinants – are insufficient to distinguish vertical FDI 
from other types of FDI. On the one hand, productivity adjusted wage differentials would be 




On the other hand, MNEs based in non-traditional source countries may undertake both 
vertical and horizontal FDI in lower-income countries, with horizontal FDI in these locations 
possibly serving as testing grounds and springboards for subsequent engagements in more 
developed markets. Furthermore, the results reported so far on the interaction term 
emerging_diffgdppc may also be shaped by asset-augmenting FDI. 
Extended specification and pair fixed effects 
The estimations shown in Tables 1 and 2 do not explicitly account for the possibility of asset-
augmenting FDI flowing from relatively poor source countries to richer host countries (H6). 
Consequently, the positive correlation between diffgdppc and bilateral FDI that would result 
from vertical FDI may be biased downwards. Unless effectively controlled for, asset-
augmenting FDI would imply a negative correlation between diffgdppc and bilateral FDI. 
This would primarily affect the interaction term emerging_diffgdppc if asset-augmenting FDI 
figured prominently in the FDI portfolio of non-traditional source countries.  
We estimate an extended specification of the Poisson model to separate vertical FDI 
from asset-augmenting FDI at least tentatively. The number of patents per 1,000 inhabitants 
of the host country (patents) is added to the list of FDI determinants. We follow previous 
country studies, notably Buckley et al. (2007) and Pradhan (2011), in regarding the intensity 
of patenting as a proxy capturing the relevance of asset-augmenting FDI from non-traditional 
source countries. Data on patents are unavailable for various host countries in our sample so 
                                                 
26 Data on unit labor cost are available for a small part of our sample of host countries only. 18 
 
that the results in Table 3 are based on a much smaller number of observations. Nevertheless, 
the results on our standard list of FDI determinants are surprisingly robust.
27
Most importantly, concerns that the results on diffgdppc  and its interaction with 
emerging might be biased downwards in previous estimations appear to be unjustified. At the 
same time, the patent variable per se offers limited additional insights. One might suspect that 
the weak evidence on  patents  is due to collinearity with diffgdppc.  This is not the case, 
however. Dropping diffgdppc from the list of FDI determinants hardly affects the results on 
patents.
 
28  The IRRs of the interaction between the patent variable and emerging  are 
consistently below one, at the five percent level of significance or better, contradicting the 
view that asset-augmenting  FDI figures more prominently for non-traditional source 
countries. As stated in H6, insufficient capabilities to absorb superior technology could have 
weakened the incentive of MNEs based in non-traditional source countries to undertake asset-
augmenting FDI in higher-income countries. Country studies using the patent variable to 
assess the relevance of asset-augmenting FDI for Chinese and Indian MNEs come to similar 
conclusions (Buckley et al. 2007; Pradhan 2011).
29
In the final step of our analysis, we test whether the results of Tables 2 and 3 are 
robust to the inclusion of fixed effects for each source-host country pair. Note that all time-
invariant variables drop out of the Panel Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimations 
reported in Table 4.
 
30 Following Warin et al. (2009), we keep a distance-related variable by 
relating the time-invariant  logdistance  to the host countries’ population. The results on 
logdistpop per se are not particularly intuitive, which is most probably because of its minor 
variation within country pairs.
31
The benchmark results on economic instability (hostinfl) and political uncertainty 
(polcon) for the overall sample of source countries prove to be stronger in Table 4 than in the 
 Nevertheless, the previous finding that distance primarily 
discourages FDI from non-traditional sources carries over to the panel estimation, as revealed 
by (three out of four) IRRs significantly below one for the interaction term 
emerging_logdistpop. 
                                                 
27 The most notable exception is that the evidence on resource-seeking FDI weakens considerably; all related 
variables prove to be insignificant at conventional levels in Table 3. The same applies to the interaction terms 
with the dummy variable for neighboring countries (emerging_contig) and for colonial ties (emerging_colony). 
28 Specifically, the IRRs on patents continue to be insignificant except for the specification in column II. The 
results achieved after excluding diffgdppc are not shown here, but are available on request. 
29 As noted by Buckley et al. (2007: 513), “the asset-seeking hypothesis is more likely to be supported for more 
recent years.” 
30 The considerably reduced number of observations underlying the results reported in Table 4 is for technical 
reasons. In contrast to previous models, the panel estimations eliminate the entire observation if any explanatory 
variable is missing. 
31 For the same reason, several IRRs are no longer significantly different from one when assessing the impact of 
bilateral treaties (dtt, bit) and regional agreements (rta) within country pairs. 19 
 
corresponding estimations reported in Tables 2 and 3.
32
Turning to major types of FDI, the benchmark results for all source countries in Table 
4 are closely in line with previous results in the corresponding columns of Tables 2 and 3 on 
the driving forces of horizontal FDI. The IRRs for the size and growth of host-country GDP 
(loggdphost, hostgrw) as well as the real market potential (lrmp) are typically above one and 
highly significant. The evidence is less clear with regard to the interactions of these variables 
with the dummy variable for non-traditional source countries. The interactions with 
loggdphost suggest that horizontal FDI figures more prominently for FDI from non-traditional 
sources. Increasing market size (and, in some cases, also higher market growth) has stronger 
effects on FDI flows from non-traditional sources within country pairs. Yet the evidence for 
this type of FDI is not consistently in conflict with H3, taking into account that the interaction 
with lrmp proves to be insignificant at conventional levels of significance. 
 IRRs significantly below one for 
hostinfl and IRRs significantly above one for polcon suggest that bilateral FDI within country 
pairs is generally discouraged under conditions of increasing economic instability and 
political uncertainty. All the same, the panel results in Table 4 reinforce the previous finding 
that FDI from non-traditional sources is as sensitive to economic instability and political 
uncertainty as FDI from traditional sources. None of the relevant interaction terms, 
emerging_hostinfl and emerging_ polcon, differs significantly from one in Table 4 – similar 
to the corresponding estimations in Tables 2 and 3 before. 
As concerns vertical FDI, the estimations with pair fixed effects in columns I and II of 
Table 4 indicate that the impact of differences in per-capita GDP (diffgdppc) tends to be 
blurred when pooling traditional and non-traditional source countries. Allowing for 
differential effects between traditional and non-traditional sources, the IRRs for diffgdppc per 
se prove to be significantly above one, while the IRRs for its interaction with the dummy 
variable for non-traditional sources prove to be significantly below one. This finding supports 
H4. While increasing income gaps within source-host country pairs are generally associated 
with higher (vertical) FDI flows, this effect is comparatively weak for pairs with non-
traditional source countries. 
Table 4 also supports H5  that resource-seeking FDI is unlikely to constitute a 
particularly large share of FDI from non-traditional sources. As in Tables 2 and 3 before, the 
interaction between the host countries’ endowment of raw materials and the dummy variable 
for FDI from non-traditional sources is either insignificant or below one (at the five percent 
level in column V of Table 4). In general, the results on resourcedeplet are less intuitive once 
                                                 
32 The insignificant results for hostinfl in columns I, III and V of Table 4 (without patents) are an exception.  20 
 
pair fixed effects are accounted for. This is probably because the endowment of raw materials 
varies only moderately within country pairs. Finally, the inclusion of the patent variable 
(patents) in columns II, IV and VI of Table 4 offers no additional insights. 
 
5.  Summary and conclusion 
Proponents of globalization as well as prominent critics largely agree that FDI could bring 
considerable  benefits to the  host countries  (e.g., OECD 2002; Stiglitz 2000). However, 
various locations where the need for foreign capital, technology and know-how appears to be 
greatest have traditionally been sidelined by multinational enterprises. According to the so-
called Monterrey Consensus, achieved at the UN summit on financing for development in 
2003, “a central challenge, therefore, is to create the necessary domestic and international 
conditions to facilitate direct investment flows (…)  to developing countries, particularly 
Africa, least developed countries, small island developing states, and landlocked developing 
countries, and also to countries with economies in transition” (UN 2003: 9). 
FDI from non-traditional sources could help meet this challenge. Emerging economies 
play an increasingly important role as sources of FDI, notably in developing host countries. 
Moreover, FDI from these sources is widely perceived to be better adapted to local conditions 
in developing host countries. Yet it is open to question under which conditions host countries 
have more options available to lure FDI from different sources. Much depends on whether the 
determinants of FDI differ systematically between traditional and non-traditional source 
countries. We performed Logit and Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimations on 
bilateral FDI flows for large samples of source and host countries to address this question. 
We find little evidence that FDI from non-traditional sources is mainly resource 
seeking or asset augmenting. In contrast to widespread belief, the endowment of host 
countries with raw materials proved to be of minor importance for FDI from non-traditional 
sources, compared to FDI from traditional sources. In other words, it is not only resource-rich 
countries that have favorable chances to attract FDI from non-traditional sources. Asset-
augmenting FDI may figure more prominently in the future once non-traditional source 
countries are less constrained in absorbing superior technologies available in more advanced 
host countries. In the past, however, a few large and publicized acquisitions of European and 
US firms by investors from emerging markets (e.g., the acquisitions of Arcelor by Mittal in 
the steel industry and IBM’s PC business by Lenovo) tend to disguise that the availability of 
superior technologies was a minor driving force of FDI from non-traditional sources. 21 
 
Nevertheless, various host countries will find it as difficult to attract FDI from non-
traditional sources as before from traditional sources. First of all, we find strong empirical 
support for the hypothesis that direct investors based in emerging markets are more 
discouraged than their peers based in developed countries to engage in more distant host 
countries. This holds for both stages of location choice, i.e., the decision to undertake any FDI 
at all as well as the decision on the amount of FDI in host countries having passed the 
gatekeeping stage. Accordingly, investment promotion agencies are well advised to target 
new sources of FDI in the closer neighborhood. 
The evidence on the driving forces of horizontal and vertical FDI is more ambiguous. 
It appears that cost savings do not only motivate vertical FDI flows from the most advanced 
source countries, even though the impact on FDI amounts tends to be weaker for non-
traditional sources. By contrast, large and growing local markets are no less attractive for FDI 
from non-traditional sources than for FDI from traditional sources. This suggests that the 
chances are slim for small host countries with limited purchasing power to target new 
investors based in emerging markets as alternative sources of FDI. This conclusion is 
corroborated by particularly strong agglomeration effects on FDI from non-traditional 
sources. 
Most strikingly perhaps, our findings contradict the view that non-traditional investors 
are less risk adverse than their peers based in advanced source countries. In other words, the 
familiarity of non-traditional investors with macroeconomic instability, political discretion 
and corruption at home does not imply that the choice of foreign locations is less affected by 
such risk factors. Consequently, it would be self-defeating if host countries gave less priority 
to macroeconomic stabilization and containing political uncertainty by institutional reforms 
and better governance. This would not only deter traditional investors but also investors from 
emerging markets, even though future research may reveal that direct investors operating 
under difficult political and economic conditions at home may react differently to specific 
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TABLE 1 – Logit model with country fixed effects 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
VARIABLES  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio 
                             
logdistance  0.315***  0.356***  0.353***  0.341***  0.336***  0.337***  0.388***  0.382***  0.377*** 
   (0.0171)  (0.0178)  (0.0177)  (0.0178)  (0.0180)  (0.0182)  (0.0260)  (0.0263)  (0.0261) 
contig  1.251  0.962  0.970  0.974  0.892  0.923  1.047  1.220  1.190 
   (0.237)  (0.249)  (0.251)  (0.255)  (0.240)  (0.253)  (0.286)  (0.347)  (0.338) 
comlang  2.456***  2.264***  2.248***  2.210***  2.224***  2.226***  2.073***  2.007***  1.992*** 
   (0.246)  (0.258)  (0.257)  (0.253)  (0.257)  (0.259)  (0.242)  (0.239)  (0.238) 
colony  2.069***  2.538***  2.536***  2.594***  2.528***  2.546***  2.299***  2.321***  2.346*** 
   (0.280)  (0.349)  (0.349)  (0.359)  (0.355)  (0.362)  (0.330)  (0.346)  (0.350) 
loggdphost  1.079     1.013  1.026  1.128  1.128  1.088  1.073    
   (0.130)     (0.105)  (0.116)  (0.134)  (0.135)  (0.130)  (0.131)    
hostgrw  1.009     1.031***  1.032***  1.011  1.008  1.010  1.010  1.010 
   (0.00815)     (0.00742)  (0.00804)  (0.00855)  (0.00856)  (0.00857)  (0.00875)  (0.00888) 
hostinfl  0.994        1.014  0.995  0.995  0.996  1.010  1.003 
   (0.0251)        (0.0248)  (0.0253)  (0.0253)  (0.0255)  (0.0270)  (0.0267) 
diffgdppc  0.980**        0.996  0.994  0.991  0.987  0.984*  0.984* 
   (0.00877)        (0.00847)  (0.00891)  (0.00898)  (0.00915)  (0.00937)  (0.00914) 
hosttrade  1.003        1.003  1.003  1.003  1.002  1.002  1.001 
   (0.00229)        (0.00206)  (0.00226)  (0.00229)  (0.00229)  (0.00234)  (0.00236) 
logfdistock  1.123***           1.120***  1.123***  1.096***  1.100***  1.099*** 
   (0.0336)           (0.0283)  (0.0286)  (0.0285)  (0.0343)  (0.0339) 
polcon  1.671**              1.605*  1.542*  1.609*  1.631* 
   (0.405)              (0.395)  (0.382)  (0.412)  (0.418) 
rta  1.025                 1.376**  1.320**  1.328** 
   (0.114)                 (0.181)  (0.177)  (0.178) 
dtt  1.703***                 1.679***  1.693***  1.683*** 
   (0.128)                 (0.144)  (0.148)  (0.147) 
bit  1.311***                 1.274***  1.286***  1.284*** 
   (0.0938)                 (0.106)  (0.108)  (0.108) 
resourcedeplet  0.629                    0.922  0.939 
   (0.471)                    (0.696)  (0.715) 
lrmp                          1.052 
                           (0.119) 
emerging  0.224***  23.61***  17.86***  3.044  4.155  4.042  4.733  3.475  0.750 
   (0.0677)  (21.68)  (17.57)  (3.362)  (4.840)  (4.717)  (5.895)  (4.436)  (1.126) 
emerging_logdistance     0.604***  0.584***  0.598***  0.593***  0.588***  0.568***  0.590***  0.606*** 
      (0.0604)  (0.0600)  (0.0622)  (0.0640)  (0.0638)  (0.0693)  (0.0739)  (0.0760) 
emerging_contig     1.040  0.998  1.122  1.206  1.134  0.981  0.882  0.943 
      (0.373)  (0.359)  (0.410)  (0.452)  (0.431)  (0.376)  (0.346)  (0.370) 
emerging_comlang     1.372  1.399  1.646**  1.718**  1.714**  1.586*  1.663**  1.657** 
      (0.307)  (0.322)  (0.387)  (0.412)  (0.413)  (0.385)  (0.411)  (0.403) 
emerging_colony     0.882  0.851  0.823  0.737  0.732  0.847  0.818  0.797 
      (0.335)  (0.327)  (0.317)  (0.287)  (0.286)  (0.333)  (0.323)  (0.315) 
emerging_loggdphost        1.047  1.172***  1.089  1.085  1.086  1.078    
         (0.0343)  (0.0531)  (0.0703)  (0.0706)  (0.0724)  (0.0756)    
emerging_hostgrw        1.004  0.982  0.990  0.992  0.991  0.992  0.996 
         (0.0131)  (0.0133)  (0.0142)  (0.0144)  (0.0144)  (0.0151)  (0.0153) 
emerging_hostinfl           0.909**  0.924*  0.925*  0.932*  0.929*  0.949 
            (0.0357)  (0.0374)  (0.0376)  (0.0381)  (0.0391)  (0.0407) 
emerging_diffgdppc           1.023***  1.018**  1.019**  1.021**  1.024**  1.027*** 
            (0.00897)  (0.00901)  (0.00921)  (0.00969)  (0.00979)  (0.00974) 28 
 
TABLE 1 – continued 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
VARIABLES  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio 
emerging_hosttrade           1.009***  1.007***  1.007***  1.007***  1.008***  1.006*** 
            (0.00179)  (0.00193)  (0.00196)  (0.00199)  (0.00205)  (0.00170) 
emerging_logfdistock              1.065  1.065  1.077  1.092*  1.109*** 
               (0.0504)  (0.0507)  (0.0518)  (0.0576)  (0.0435) 
emerging_polcon                 1.212  1.319  1.029  1.014 
                  (0.411)  (0.454)  (0.372)  (0.366) 
emerging_rta                    0.770  0.787  0.787 
                     (0.206)  (0.212)  (0.210) 
emerging_dtt                    0.977  0.955  0.960 
                     (0.153)  (0.153)  (0.151) 
emerging_bit                    1.032  0.982  0.970 
                     (0.166)  (0.160)  (0.158) 
emerging_resourcedeplet                       0.111**  0.191* 
                        (0.101)  (0.177) 
emerging_lrmp                          1.144** 
                           (0.0711) 
                             
Observations  19,215  21,175  21,102  20,967  20,042  19,868  19,868  19,215  19,215 
Country FE  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year Dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Interactions  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Pseudo R-squared  0.479  0.478  0.480  0.480  0.479  0.480  0.483  0.482  0.482 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; coefficients for the year, source and host dummies are not shown; ***, ** 
and * denote significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively. 
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TABLE 2 – Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood model with country fixed effects 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
VARIABLES  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR 
                             
logdistance  0.595***  0.608***  0.608***  0.605***  0.607***  0.610***  0.649***  0.641***  0.637*** 
   (0.0158)  (0.0142)  (0.0141)  (0.0143)  (0.0143)  (0.0144)  (0.0201)  (0.0202)  (0.0204) 
contig  0.685***  0.676***  0.683***  0.681***  0.674***  0.669***  0.710***  0.707***  0.711*** 
   (0.0367)  (0.0390)  (0.0392)  (0.0387)  (0.0384)  (0.0384)  (0.0415)  (0.0411)  (0.0412) 
comlang  1.406***  1.330***  1.325***  1.322***  1.336***  1.354***  1.273***  1.270***  1.258*** 
   (0.0646)  (0.0676)  (0.0666)  (0.0660)  (0.0665)  (0.0674)  (0.0630)  (0.0629)  (0.0624) 
colony  1.417***  1.492***  1.503***  1.508***  1.509***  1.479***  1.519***  1.520***  1.520*** 
   (0.0749)  (0.0848)  (0.0839)  (0.0837)  (0.0825)  (0.0812)  (0.0824)  (0.0833)  (0.0834) 
loggdphost  1.372***     1.245***  1.356***  1.441***  1.436***  1.324***  1.362***    
   (0.0931)     (0.0732)  (0.0852)  (0.0958)  (0.0952)  (0.0883)  (0.0936)    
hostgrw  1.013***     1.030***  1.027***  1.015***  1.014***  1.015***  1.014***  1.015*** 
   (0.00476)     (0.00447)  (0.00464)  (0.00484)  (0.00486)  (0.00484)  (0.00497)  (0.00505) 
hostinfl  0.997        1.001  0.988  0.987  0.987  0.996  0.987 
   (0.0142)        (0.0139)  (0.0143)  (0.0142)  (0.0145)  (0.0146)  (0.0145) 
diffgdppc  1.003        1.024***  1.018***  1.015***  1.003  1.006  1.001 
   (0.00478)        (0.00452)  (0.00465)  (0.00472)  (0.00482)  (0.00497)  (0.00489) 
hosttrade  1.000        1.002  1.002  1.002  1.001  1.000  0.999 
   (0.00123)        (0.00119)  (0.00124)  (0.00125)  (0.00124)  (0.00124)  (0.00128) 
logfdistock  1.053***           1.061***  1.063***  1.045***  1.041**  1.055*** 
   (0.0201)           (0.0171)  (0.0174)  (0.0161)  (0.0186)  (0.0199) 
polcon  1.208              1.385**  1.316**  1.228  1.267* 
   (0.164)              (0.185)  (0.176)  (0.170)  (0.175) 
rta  1.180***                 1.274***  1.248***  1.238*** 
   (0.0709)                 (0.0825)  (0.0819)  (0.0813) 
dtt  1.764***                 1.633***  1.688***  1.708*** 
   (0.0833)                 (0.0824)  (0.0884)  (0.0900) 
bit  1.428***                 1.372***  1.363***  1.366*** 
   (0.0519)                 (0.0564)  (0.0566)  (0.0571) 
resourcedeplet  4.691**                    6.781***  4.805** 
   (3.106)                    (4.452)  (3.207) 
lrmp                          1.171*** 
                           (0.0647) 
emerging  0.0922***  0.276**  0.108***  0.109***  0.524  0.519  0.228*  0.322  0.0551*** 
   (0.0142)  (0.169)  (0.0758)  (0.0868)  (0.446)  (0.439)  (0.195)  (0.289)  (0.0537) 
emerging_logdistance     0.835***  0.814***  0.821***  0.739***  0.732***  0.770***  0.768***  0.805*** 
      (0.0531)  (0.0548)  (0.0563)  (0.0526)  (0.0524)  (0.0583)  (0.0612)  (0.0612) 
emerging_contig     1.907***  1.876***  1.919***  1.613***  1.598***  1.285  1.320*  1.387** 
      (0.287)  (0.285)  (0.295)  (0.252)  (0.251)  (0.209)  (0.217)  (0.228) 
emerging_comlang     2.078***  2.324***  2.363***  2.139***  2.102***  2.050***  2.162***  2.301*** 
      (0.259)  (0.295)  (0.299)  (0.275)  (0.269)  (0.262)  (0.295)  (0.311) 
emerging_colony     0.719  0.560**  0.570**  0.669*  0.678*  0.718*  0.715*  0.661** 
      (0.166)  (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.155)  (0.157)  (0.140)  (0.138)  (0.129) 
emerging_loggdphost        1.103***  1.127***  0.905  0.904  0.946  0.923    
         (0.0238)  (0.0325)  (0.0595)  (0.0596)  (0.0571)  (0.0633)    
emerging_hostgrw        0.982*  0.980*  0.978*  0.979*  0.988  0.990  0.991 
         (0.0102)  (0.0106)  (0.0120)  (0.0122)  (0.0121)  (0.0129)  (0.0126) 
emerging_hostinfl           0.994  1.018  1.021  1.036  1.039  1.050* 
            (0.0257)  (0.0281)  (0.0278)  (0.0281)  (0.0292)  (0.0305) 
emerging_diffgdppc           1.000  0.998  0.999  1.001  1.001  1.007 
            (0.00518)  (0.00519)  (0.00537)  (0.00536)  (0.00558)  (0.00578) 30 
 
TABLE 2 – continued 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
VARIABLES  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR 
emerging_hosttrade           1.002*  0.999  0.999  0.998  0.999  1.000 
            (0.00108)  (0.00130)  (0.00134)  (0.00132)  (0.00142)  (0.00107) 
emerging_logfdistock              1.226***  1.227***  1.173***  1.198***  1.127*** 
               (0.0747)  (0.0756)  (0.0656)  (0.0776)  (0.0383) 
emerging_polcon                 1.108  0.925  0.726  0.711 
                  (0.262)  (0.218)  (0.192)  (0.187) 
emerging_rta                    0.991  0.962  0.999 
                     (0.155)  (0.150)  (0.156) 
emerging_dtt                    1.002  0.915  0.906 
                     (0.107)  (0.102)  (0.102) 
emerging_bit                    1.116  1.091  1.074 
                     (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.102) 
emerging_resourcedeplet                       0.0598***  0.0828*** 
                        (0.0500)  (0.0709) 
emerging_lrmp                          1.054 
                           (0.0428) 
                             
Observations  19,215  21,175  21,102  20,967  20,042  19,868  19,868  19,215  19,215 
Country FE  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year Dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Interactions  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Pseudo R-squared  0.537  0.534  0.536  0.536  0.535  0.535  0.542  0.542  0.541 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity; coefficients for the year, source and 




TABLE 3 –  Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood model with country fixed effects: 
extended specification 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
VARIABLES  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR 
                       
logdistance  0.609***  0.609***  0.613***  0.616***  0.646***  0.646***  0.641*** 
   (0.0166)  (0.0151)  (0.0153)  (0.0154)  (0.0210)  (0.0210)  (0.0211) 
contig  0.718***  0.723***  0.722***  0.717***  0.755***  0.756***  0.754*** 
   (0.0386)  (0.0411)  (0.0411)  (0.0410)  (0.0437)  (0.0436)  (0.0435) 
comlang  1.337***  1.249***  1.252***  1.265***  1.198***  1.202***  1.196*** 
   (0.0640)  (0.0645)  (0.0647)  (0.0653)  (0.0611)  (0.0612)  (0.0609) 
colony  1.366***  1.446***  1.450***  1.427***  1.468***  1.460***  1.459*** 
   (0.0736)  (0.0820)  (0.0814)  (0.0806)  (0.0822)  (0.0815)  (0.0815) 
loggdphost  1.206**  1.261***  1.287***  1.291***  1.166**  1.203**    
   (0.0915)  (0.0902)  (0.0953)  (0.0957)  (0.0874)  (0.0923)    
hostgrw  1.011*  1.023***  1.014**  1.013**  1.013**  1.013**  1.013** 
   (0.00566)  (0.00563)  (0.00587)  (0.00591)  (0.00591)  (0.00590)  (0.00595) 
hostinfl  0.973*  1.003  0.986  0.984  0.973*  0.973  0.965** 
   (0.0158)  (0.0155)  (0.0161)  (0.0161)  (0.0162)  (0.0162)  (0.0159) 
hosttrade  1.001  1.002  1.001  1.001  1.001  1.001  1.000 
   (0.00131)  (0.00134)  (0.00134)  (0.00134)  (0.00133)  (0.00132)  (0.00138) 
patents  1.080  1.104*  1.090  1.088  1.089  1.090  1.075 
   (0.0700)  (0.0658)  (0.0727)  (0.0725)  (0.0705)  (0.0699)  (0.0696) 
diffgdppc  1.002  1.027***  1.021***  1.018***  1.003  1.005  1.002 
   (0.00520)  (0.00495)  (0.00510)  (0.00522)  (0.00531)  (0.00541)  (0.00527) 
logfdistock  1.056***     1.102***  1.104***  1.082***  1.048**  1.055*** 
   (0.0215)     (0.0225)  (0.0232)  (0.0219)  (0.0199)  (0.0211) 
polcon  1.182        1.337**  1.332**  1.207  1.228 
   (0.170)        (0.195)  (0.194)  (0.177)  (0.180) 
rta  1.159**           1.217***  1.205***  1.197*** 
   (0.0707)           (0.0809)  (0.0803)  (0.0800) 
dtt  1.736***           1.632***  1.642***  1.640*** 
   (0.0872)           (0.0899)  (0.0910)  (0.0911) 
bit  1.431***           1.378***  1.368***  1.371*** 
   (0.0538)           (0.0593)  (0.0589)  (0.0592) 
resourcedeplet  1.823              2.340  1.657 
   (1.804)              (2.293)  (1.613) 
lrmp                    1.126** 
                     (0.0672) 
emerging  0.0875***  0.260  0.588  0.589  0.153*  0.162*  0.0436*** 
   (0.0147)  (0.224)  (0.559)  (0.558)  (0.151)  (0.160)  (0.0478) 
emerging_logdistance     0.733***  0.699***  0.700***  0.767***  0.765***  0.782*** 
      (0.0550)  (0.0550)  (0.0559)  (0.0674)  (0.0677)  (0.0674) 
emerging_contig     1.325*  1.241  1.261  1.098  1.095  1.116 
      (0.226)  (0.215)  (0.223)  (0.203)  (0.205)  (0.209) 
emerging_comlang     2.223***  2.074***  2.044***  2.133***  2.119***  2.179*** 
      (0.325)  (0.313)  (0.309)  (0.312)  (0.309)  (0.321) 
emerging_colony     0.808  0.851  0.867  0.834  0.837  0.799 
      (0.172)  (0.182)  (0.184)  (0.151)  (0.151)  (0.145) 
emerging_loggdphost     1.174***  0.982  0.982  1.034  1.029    
      (0.0373)  (0.0771)  (0.0771)  (0.0779)  (0.0778)    
emerging_hostgrw     0.975*  0.976*  0.976*  0.985  0.984  0.988 
      (0.0129)  (0.0136)  (0.0138)  (0.0140)  (0.0140)  (0.0140) 
emerging_hostinfl     0.957  0.996  0.997  1.020  1.020  1.034 
      (0.0298)  (0.0314)  (0.0314)  (0.0318)  (0.0316)  (0.0332) 
emerging_hosttrade     1.002  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.999 
      (0.00110)  (0.00143)  (0.00149)  (0.00148)  (0.00150)  (0.00109) 
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TABLE 3 –  continued 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
VARIABLES  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR 
emerging_patents     0.641***  0.730***  0.736***  0.804**  0.808**  0.809** 
      (0.0636)  (0.0738)  (0.0741)  (0.0769)  (0.0775)  (0.0753) 
emerging_diffgdppc     0.989*  0.992  0.991  0.997  0.997  1.002 
      (0.00614)  (0.00628)  (0.00640)  (0.00630)  (0.00634)  (0.00651) 
emerging_logfdistock        1.180**  1.176**  1.124  1.132*  1.132*** 
         (0.0864)  (0.0872)  (0.0810)  (0.0822)  (0.0443) 
emerging_polcon           0.909  0.708  0.711  0.721 
            (0.242)  (0.186)  (0.199)  (0.201) 
emerging_rta              0.936  0.944  0.962 
               (0.159)  (0.160)  (0.162) 
emerging_dtt              1.061  1.052  1.059 
               (0.124)  (0.123)  (0.125) 
emerging_bit              1.024  1.030  1.012 
               (0.100)  (0.101)  (0.100) 
emerging_resourcedeplet                 0.888  1.646 
                  (0.871)  (1.632) 
emerging_lrmp                    1.093** 
                     (0.0485) 
                       
Observations  13,124  13,988  13,431  13,344  13,344  13,124  13,124 
Country FE  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year Dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Interactions  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Pseudo R-squared  0.501  0.503  0.501  0.502  0.509  0.506  0.506 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity; coefficients for the year, source and 




TABLE 4 – Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood model with country pair fixed effects 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
VARIABLES  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR 
                    
logdistpop  0.940  0.855  1.453  1.256  1.290  1.178 
   (0.242)  (0.267)  (0.398)  (0.415)  (0.338)  (0.368) 
loggdphost  1.387***  1.286***  1.366***  1.271***       
   (0.0660)  (0.0669)  (0.0652)  (0.0670)       
hostgrw  1.013***  1.010**  1.010**  1.007  1.015***  1.011** 
   (0.00404)  (0.00472)  (0.00419)  (0.00499)  (0.00436)  (0.00512) 
hostinfl  0.982  0.952***  0.985  0.956***  0.980  0.953*** 
   (0.0124)  (0.0134)  (0.0131)  (0.0146)  (0.0131)  (0.0144) 
diffgdppc  1.006  1.003  1.019***  1.016**  1.015**  1.013** 
   (0.00540)  (0.00592)  (0.00608)  (0.00684)  (0.00586)  (0.00656) 
patents     0.998     1.001     0.963 
      (0.0676)     (0.0692)     (0.0662) 
hosttrade  1.001  1.001  1.002  1.002  1.000  1.000 
   (0.00118)  (0.00125)  (0.00126)  (0.00135)  (0.00130)  (0.00135) 
logfdistock  1.067***  1.074***  1.066***  1.073***  1.084***  1.084*** 
   (0.0193)  (0.0219)  (0.0189)  (0.0212)  (0.0179)  (0.0190) 
polcon  1.436***  1.377**  1.410***  1.379**  1.468***  1.414** 
   (0.176)  (0.184)  (0.179)  (0.194)  (0.186)  (0.198) 
rta  0.977  0.943  0.925  0.901  0.919  0.898 
   (0.0664)  (0.0631)  (0.0641)  (0.0635)  (0.0628)  (0.0623) 
dtt  1.118*  1.122*  1.110  1.101  1.106  1.087 
   (0.0736)  (0.0763)  (0.0799)  (0.0818)  (0.0793)  (0.0801) 
bit  1.189***  1.208***  1.143*  1.175*  1.130  1.171* 
   (0.0785)  (0.0860)  (0.0854)  (0.0967)  (0.0856)  (0.0970) 
resourcedeplet  0.961  0.154**  1.449  0.214*  1.237  0.178* 
   (0.664)  (0.136)  (1.000)  (0.200)  (0.927)  (0.165) 
lrmp              1.268***  1.226*** 
               (0.0456)  (0.0464) 
emerging_logdistpop        0.201*  0.191  0.0833***  0.0558*** 
         (0.173)  (0.202)  (0.0707)  (0.0548) 
emerging_loggdphost        1.652**  1.771***       
         (0.329)  (0.392)       
emerging_hostgrw        1.027**  1.017  1.027*  1.017 
         (0.0137)  (0.0137)  (0.0152)  (0.0149) 
emerging_hostinfl        0.991  0.980  0.991  0.981 
         (0.0407)  (0.0418)  (0.0407)  (0.0432) 
emerging_diffgdppc        0.965**  0.960**  0.960***  0.957*** 
         (0.0139)  (0.0152)  (0.0133)  (0.0145) 
emerging_patents           0.647     0.680 
            (0.213)     (0.222) 
emerging_hosttrade        0.995  0.995  0.996  0.994* 
         (0.00330)  (0.00337)  (0.00353)  (0.00350) 
emerging_logfdistock        0.935  0.933  0.995  0.999 
         (0.0796)  (0.0925)  (0.110)  (0.125) 
emerging_polcon        0.864  0.708  0.925  0.742 
         (0.353)  (0.302)  (0.386)  (0.329) 
emerging_rta        1.295  1.264  1.261  1.235 
         (0.300)  (0.290)  (0.290)  (0.280) 
emerging_dtt        0.857  0.881  0.925  0.946 
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TABLE 4 – continued 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
VARIABLES  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR  IRR 
         (0.160)  (0.176)  (0.173)  (0.191) 
emerging_bit        0.955  0.927  0.986  0.948 
         (0.156)  (0.157)  (0.162)  (0.160) 
emerging_resourcedeplet        0.0282  1.046  0.00196**  0.231 
         (0.0653)  (2.496)  (0.00494)  (0.623) 
emerging_lrmp              0.965  1.040 
               (0.146)  (0.165) 
                    
Observations  7,139  5,842  7,139  5,842  7,139  5,842 
Number of pairs  1,131  1,005  1,131  1,005  1,131  1,005 
Pair Fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Interactions  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity; coefficients for the year and source-




Appendix A: Definition of variables and data sources  
Variable  Definition  Source 
logfdi  Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment flows from 





logdistance  Log of distance between two countries based 
on bilateral distances between the largest cities 
of those two countries, weighted by the share 
of the city in the overall country’s population 
CEPII Gravity Dataset; 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances
.htm 
contig  Dummy variable, set equal to one in the case of 
host and source countries sharing a common 
border 
CEPII Gravity Dataset; 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances
.htm 
comlang  Dummy variable, set equal to one in the case of 
host and source countries sharing a common 
language 
CEPII Gravity Dataset; 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances
.htm 
colony  Dummy variable, set equal to one in the case of 
host and source countries sharing colonial ties 
CEPII Gravity Dataset; 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances
.htm 
loggdphost  Log of GDP of the host country, in US dollars  World Bank, World Development Indicators 
hostgrw  Real GDP growth rate of host country in 
percent 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
diffgdppc  Difference between source and host countries’ 
GDP per capita, in US dollars 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
hostinfl  Inflation rate of the host country in percent 
(GDP deflator) 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
hosttrade  Sum of imports and exports of the host country 
in percent of GDP  
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
polcon  Political constraints III, Henisz database, range 
from 0 to 1 
Henisz (2000) 
dtt  Dummy variable, set equal to one in the case of 
a double taxation treaty ratified between source 
and host country 
IBFD, Tax Treaty Database; 
http://www.ibfd.org 
bit  Dummy variable, set equal to one in the case of 
a bilateral investment treaty ratified between 




rta  Dummy variable, set equal to one in the case of 
a regional trade agreement with source and 
host country as members 
WTO; http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm  
logfdistock  Log of the stock of Foreign Direct Investment 




patents  Patent applications by residents and non-
residents, divided by total population in 
thousands 
World Intellectual Property Organization 
http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patent
s/ 
resourcedeplet  Natural resources depletion in percent of Gross 
National Income; sum of net forest depletion, 
energy depletion, and mineral depletion. 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
lrmp  Log of Real Market Potential computed using 
Head and Mayer (2004)’s method 
Market Potential and Development CEPII 
working paper N° 2009-24. 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/marketpo
tentials.htm 
emerging  Dummy variable, set equal to one when the 
source country is an emerging economy 
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Appendix B: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
logfdi  21,175  0.81  1.87  0.00  10.98 
logdistance  21,175  8.78  0.81  5.08  9.89 
contig  21,175  0.02  0.15  0.00  1.00 
comlang  21,175  0.11  0.31  0.00  1.00 
colony  21,175  0.03  0.18  0.00  1.00 
loggdphost  21,102  10.13  2.10  3.47  16.22 
hostgrw  21,102  3.28  4.94  -18.20  77.70 
hostinfl  20,967  2.72  1.63  -3.26  9.44 
diffgdppc  20,967  9.29  11.21  -32.20  37.09 
hosttrade  20,967  72.39  37.92  9.31  245.81 
logfdistock  20,042  7.80  2.59  -4.61  14.84 
polcon  19,868  0.31  0.21  0.00  0.71 
rta  19,868  0.13  0.33  0.00  1.00 
dtt  19,868  0.33  0.47  0.00  1.00 
bit  19,868  0.15  0.35  0.00  1.00 
resourcedeplet  19,215  0.05  0.10  0.00  0.94 
lrmp  19,215  15.02  1.42  12.33  19.66 
patents  13,988  0.28  0.49  0.00  3.31 
Appendix C: Source country sample 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, China Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela. 
Note: Emerging source countries in italics. 
Appendix D: Host country sample 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, 
China,  Colombia,  Congo, Republic,  Costa Rica,  Côte d'Ivoire,  Croatia,  Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, 
Haiti,  Honduras,  Hungary,  Iceland, India, Indonesia,  Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  Japan,  Jordan, 
Kazakhstan,  Kenya, Republic of Korea, Latvia,  Lithuania,  Madagascar,  Malaysia,  Mali, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines,  Poland,  Portugal,  Romania,  Russian Federation,  Saudi Arabia,  Senegal, 
Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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